The flaw, which is referred to as Heartbleed, was introduced into the code upstream in December 2011. when exploited, it leaks the contents of memory from server to client and vice versa.
The OpenBSD project is in no way responsible for OpenSSL; however, like many other operating systems it does include the software library in its own distribution.
However, it has taken on the task of cleaning up the code, first for use in its own distribution and later, if possible, by others. The project has a reputation for being extra-careful about security and many websites that look for that extra layer of protection run on OpenBSD.
splitting up the libcrypto and libssl build directories;
fixing a use-after-free bug;
removal of ancient MacOS, Netware, OS/2, VMS and Windows build junk;
removal of “bugs” directory, benchmarks, INSTALL files, and shared library goo for lame platforms;
removal of most (all?) backend engines, some of which didn’t even have appropriate licensing;
ripping out some windows-specific cruft;
removal of various wrappers for things like sockets, snprintf, opendir, etc. to actually expose real return values:
KNF of most C files (Kernel normal form, or KNF, is the coding style used in the development of code for the BSD operating systems);
removal of weak entropy additions; and
removal of all heartbeat functionality which resulted in Heartbleed.
"We make no promises to anyone else at this point," De Raadt said. "The codebase we are starting from is very bad."
"We are first trying to make this fit for our own purposes, then more generally fit for purpose. Current OpenSSL does not meet that standard by any stretch of the imagination."