David Heath
Wednesday, 28 January 2009 02:27
Interestingly, supposedly self-securing documents (such as a passport) have no concept of authentication – they step directly from Identity to Authorisation.
The link between who we are and our identity is tenuous at best; just about the only formalised "identity" we have is nothing more than a paper trail. Although credit databases are powerful tools, they are still not who we are.
Mind you, even an excellent paper trail can prove nothing - Timothy McVeigh, for example, was generally perceived as a fine, upstanding citizen. Also, the opposite - the absence of a paper trail - is no more (or less) useful. Knowing nothing about an identity is not the same as rejecting it.
Some identity documents, driver's licences for instance, are easy to fake (or acquire), yet are treated like gold. There were numerous reports in the media that at least two of the 9/11 terrorists held valid (although in false names) Virginia licences. What does that tell us about the reliability of identity documents?
There is a huge effort expended on designing and implementing a self-protecting identity token (driver's licence, passport etc) and far too little effort on the validity of the actual identity, or on checking the legitimacy of the token. I recall reading press reports in 2004 showing just how seriously the Australian government takes passport control - in the previous year, over 3000 people complained of errors in the passport they were issued - including one Caucasian woman who found the photo of an Asian man in hers.
Think again. Most businesses only have PART of a DR plan - and this spells business disaster in the event of an IT disaster.
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