Alex Zaharov-Reutt
Friday, 19 December 2008 14:32
IT Industry -
Strategy
Page 2 of 2
The testing framework further fails to adequately address the following questions:
1. Exactly how much performance degradation, both in terms of added latency and reduced bandwidth would be considered "acceptable" for the purposes of the trial?
2. Exactly which protocols are to be inspected and potentially blocked by the filter, and under what circumstances?
3. During the trial, will there be any method of community oversight of the blocking lists to ensure that unreasonable overblocking is not occurring? If a plan for oversight exists, exactly who will be involved in this oversight?
4. What recourse will exist for businesses and other website holders who host legitimate and "wanted" content when it is found that their sites are being blocked?
5. For both the purposes of this trial and for any future filtering, will website owners be notified of their inclusion in the "unwanted" or "not safe for children" lists?
6. If a business or other website owner suspects that their website is mistakenly being blocked, is there (or will there be) a way to confirm it? Will there be a method to resolve matters such that such pages (if legitimate) are no longer blocked?
7. For any user trials, will there be a way to distinguish between a site being unavailable due to other issues and a site being unavailable due to it being blocked? Will there be a way for any user to request that a page that is being blocked be reconsidered for such cases where the page may be misclassified?
8. Can you define "unwanted content" and promise that any filter will not be subject to scope-creep where "unwanted content" expands to cover more and more things without public input?
9. What criteria will be utilised to determine the success or otherwise of this trial?
Problems with filter list maintenance
SAGE-AU also has concerns about how the filtering list will be maintained. On one hand, illegal website owners are suspected of changing their internet information regularly to avoid being found by law enforcement, so the list will need to be updated daily - in some cases, hourly - in order to be effective. On the other hand, due to the list's exemption from Freedom of Information requests and other public review, no mechanism exists to ensure that legal and child-safe sites are not accidentally blocked. In fact, website owners will be unable to confirm whether website issues are due to the filter or other technical reasons.
The test framework refers to the blacklist as containing a "majority of [...] material that would likely be classified RC by the Classification Board", but does not state whether the Classification Board will have input into the filtered content's actual classification level.
SAGE-AU suggests alternative use of funds allocated for proposed Internet filtering system
None of these issues have, to date, been addressed by the Department of Broadband, Communications, and the Digital Economy, by the Australian Communications and Media Authority or by Enex TestLab as appropriate. As such, SAGE-AU cannot support the proposed trial or any future implementation of this style of mandatory filtering scheme.
We instead suggest that a better use of public monies earmarked to fund any trial or future implementation, would instead available to the Australian Federal Police, specifically the Online Child Sex Exploitation Team and/or the Australian High-Tech Crime Centre.
Rather than unsuccessfully attempting to filter undesirable material in transit, it would be a more effective use of public funds to support law enforcement in preventing the creation and consumption of this material at its end points, just as is the case for all traditional carriage services.
We, and our members, look forward to your reply.
Yours faithfully
Donna Ashelford
on behalf of SAGE-AU and the SAGE-AU Committee of Management
SAGE-AU Code of Ethics.
Accessed Sunday, 7 December, 2008 from SAGE-AU web site:
http://www.sage-au.org.au/display/SAGEAU/Code+of+Ethics
Optus, iiNet put filters to the test.
Accessed Saturday, 6 December, 2008 from
Computerworld web site:
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/267223/optus_iinet_put_filters_test
Closed Environment Testing of ISP-Level Internet Content Filtering.
Accessed Friday, 24 October, 2008 from ACMA web site:
http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310554/isp-level_internet_content_filtering_trial-report.pdf
Bayes' Theorem 1, Mandatory Filtering 0.
Accessed Monday, 8 December 2008:
http://girtby.net/archives/2008/07/31/bayes-theorem-1-mandatory-filtering-0/
Testing Framework.
Accessed Monday, 8 December, 2008 from DBCDE web site:
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/__data/assets/text_file/0011/89165/technical-testing-framework.rtf
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That’s the letter in full, and this open letter from SAGE-AU is yet another nail in the coffin for consensus on the Internet censorship issue.
In short, no-one wants it, except those who seek to brand all who oppose it as “child pornographers”, which is simply an outrage.
Free thinking Australians will not put up with censorship. There may well have been jokes about Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd being “Chairman Rudd” in the style of Chairman Mao.
How horrific for Australia if it actually were to come true.